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Roger Bobacka* 
Collective Bargaining in Finland –  
Legitimacy through Deliberation? ** 
The inclusion of main economic interest groups in policy making poses a distinct di-
lemma for representative democracy, because the parliament often becomes effectively by-
passed in the making of important social and economic policies. The aim of this article is to 
discuss whether the arrangements instead could be legitimised as a form of deliberative 
democracy, where decisions are made through deliberation and reasoning among those 
whom decisions ultimately concern. The empirical part of the article is represented by an 
evaluation of the development of the Finnish working hours legislation in the 1990s. The 
case study shows that after the representatives from the main economic interest groups 
started deliberating the working hours issue in detail, deliberation moved from initial ex-
pressions of the need for reasoned compromise to entrenched positions. A deliberative de-
mocratic ideal, where participants should agree on a single course of action as a result of 
deliberation did not materialise in this case. The main conclusion is that even if the inclu-
sion of main economic interest groups in policy making may be legitimised by outcomes in 
terms of economic well-being, labour market peace etc., the problem from a democratic 
point of view is that the inclusion does not comply with either representative or deliberative 
democratic criteria. 
Tarifverhandlungen in Finnland – Legitimität durch Deliberation? 
Die Inklusion wirtschaftlicher Interessengruppen in den politischen Prozess stellt die 
repräsentative Demokratie vor das Problem, dass das Parlament bei wichtigen sozialen und 
ökonomischen Entscheidungen übergangen wird. Ausgangspunkt dieses Beitrags ist die 
Frage, ob Arrangements dieser Art legitimiert werden können als eine Form deliberativer 
Demokratie, in der Entscheidungen getroffen werden nach abwägender Beratung zwischen 
denen, die davon letztlich betroffen sind. Der empirische Teil bezieht sich auf die finnische 
Gesetzgebung zur Arbeitszeit in den 1990er Jahren. Die Fallstudie zeigt, dass die Repräsen-
tanten der Interessengruppen bei der Kontroverse über die Arbeitszeitfrage von anfängli-
cher Bekundung zum vernünftigen Kompromiss zu verhärteten Positionen wechselten. Eine 
für die deliberative Demokratie ideale Annahme, dass die Beteiligten nach Beratung zu ei-
nem gemeinsamen Ergebnis fänden, blieb in diesem Fall unbestätigt. Wichtigste Schlussfol-
gerung ist, dass selbst wenn die Einbeziehung der ökonomischen Interessengruppen in den 
Politikprozess nach Kriterien der wirtschaftlichen Wohlfahrt und des sozialen Friedens le-
gitimiert werden kann, bleibt es fraglich, ob ihre Inklusion mit den Kriterien der repräsen-
tativen oder der deliberativen Demokratie übereinstimmen.  
Key words:  Working hours, democracy, deliberation, Finland 
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 Introduction 
Since the mid-1960s, the main economic interest groups in Finland have con-
solidated their position at the centre of Finnish economic and labour market policy 
making. This is first of all evident by the fact that broad-based incomes policy settle-
ments have been concluded on a regular basis since 1968. The latest one is in force 
between 2000-02. Secondly, all the main economic interest groups have also enjoyed 
a routine access to pre-parliamentary legislative deliberation on labour market issues. 
The inclusion of these groups into policy making has been legitimised both by out-
comes, i.e. as a means of achieving stable economic growth and social welfare in 
general, as well as a form of consensus building. Whereas the legitimacy of the ar-
rangements in terms of outcomes is fairly straightforward and generally accepted, the 
inclusion of the main economic interest groups in pre-legislative deliberation as a 
form of consensus building is more problematic, not least from a democratic stand-
point. The aim of this paper is to evaluate whether the legitimisation of the arrange-
ments as a form of consensus building is sustainable by focusing on a collective bar-
gaining process, represented by the revision of the Finnish working hours law.  
A new working hours law was enacted in Finland in 1996, following seven years 
of deliberation among the main economic interest groups, legal experts, governments 
and various other parties on the labour market. (The working hours law had originally 
been enacted in 1917 and last revised in 1966.) The reason why the case of working 
hours has been chosen is first of all that it represents an important issue on labour 
markets in Europe at the moment. This is underlined by both the EU working time di-
rective and legislation in individual countries, the French loi Aubry representing one 
of the more controversial. Secondly, during the 1990s and early 21st century, continu-
ous demands have been made for flexibility and firm level agreements. These de-
mands also represent a distinct contemporary dilemma when it comes to organised 
labour and business. The dilemma for business is basically how to extend operating 
hours within the limits set by government regulations and collective agreements, 
whereas the basic dilemma for trade unions is how to combine demands for flexibility 
with the collective security of workers. Working hours thus represent contemporary 
problems for organised interests. The research question in this paper is therefore what 
the revision of the Finnish working hours law can tell about the legitimacy of collec-
tive bargaining at the national level between the main economic interest groups. 
1.  Collective bargaining and deliberative democracy 
The basis of legitimacy in representative democracy is that the decisions and 
laws are legitimate if they have been enacted in accordance with an accepted legiti-
mate democratic procedure. This has basically meant that decisions are legitimate if 
they have been passed by a majority in parliament, whose members have been de-
mocratically elected. The inclusion of the main economic interest groups in pre-
legislative deliberation, where the parliament has in many cases been effectively by-
passed has therefore been problematic from a representative democratic perspective. 
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There are, however, other criteria that can be used for assessing the legitimacy of the 
arrangements. These criteria are drawn on the theory of deliberative democracy. 
According to Cohen, a deliberative democracy is an ongoing and independent 
pluralistic association, where the members have divergent aims, but nonetheless have 
a commitment to the deliberative resolution of problems. The basis of legitimacy is a 
free deliberation among equals and the members should recognise each other for hav-
ing deliberative capacities. The outcomes of deliberative procedures are furthermore 
[…] ‘legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned assess-
ment among equals’ (Cohen 1989, 21-22). Similarly, Benhabib states that […] ‘le-
gitimacy in complex democratic societies must be free and unconstrained deliberation 
of all about matters of common concern’ (Benhabib 1987, 68). 
The inclusion of the main economic interest groups in policy making has been 
legitimised according to similar reasons. The emergence of the welfare state meant 
that the tasks and duties the state had to deal with greatly increased. Especially in so-
cial and economic policy making, the interests of the main economic interest groups, 
and ultimately workers and employers, could have been harmed if decisions had been 
made solely by the state’s administrative and political organs. Therefore, one of the 
reasons why the main economic interest groups were included in the deliberation of 
important labour market policies was because they were supposed to possess a good 
and specialised knowledge of the labour market. Otherwise such essential informa-
tion could have been left unnoticed. The arrangements were thus aimed at moving 
people from a subjective way of looking at problems to an objective one, replacing 
parochialism with objectivism and a sense of justice (Young 2000: 113; Mansbridge 
1992). The arrangements were in that respect also regarded a desirable complement to 
representative democracy (Hirst 1990). The problem in a collective bargaining con-
text, however, is to what extent the participants, which represent strong interests, 
have been able to comply with such an ideal. The danger is that the deliberative ideal 
of democracy falls prey to a manipulation of deliberative processes for sectional stra-
tegic purposes and interests where some must behave against their reason or convic-
tion (Cooke 2000: 968). 
A decisive feature in determining the deliberative quality of the process is there-
fore how the participants have used their knowledge of the issue under deliberation. 
For example, have they argued according to their knowledge of the issue or have they 
used their resources (threats of strikes, lockouts etc.) to influence the outcome. Have 
they accepted expert-evaluations of the issue or have they simply justified their ar-
guments by the interests of their members? If, for example, they have merely used 
their resources and power in the process in order to work for their own interests, then 
the legitimacy of the inclusion of these groups is questionable. In that case, they have 
resorted more to parochialism than objectivism and justice. Basically, it is a problem 
of whether knowledge as an essential feature of decision making is possible, or 
whether knowledge only becomes another tool in the execution of power. If, as 
Flyvbjerg (1998) argues, knowledge becomes distorted by power, consensus also be-
comes difficult to achieve as the more powerful do not have to rely only on their 
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knowledge, but can merely use their resources in order to achieve their preferences 
(Flyvbjerg 1998: 229-230). In that case, different opinions have been overruled by 
the use of power, rather than by rational arguments that everyone can accept. In this 
respect, the first hypothesis becomes that the inclusion of the main economic interest 
groups in legislative deliberation cannot be regarded legitimate because the partici-
pants are merely maximising their self-interest through the use of knowledge (as a 
form of power). It becomes a question of holding on to sectional interests and paro-
chialism rather than a case of a search for consensus through reasoned assessment of 
alternative solutions.  
This hypothesis closely relates to a so-called adversarial model of democracy, 
which is all about a strategic pursuit of goals and interests on the part of individuals. 
Actors in the democratic process compete for advantage, not to alter their opinions in 
the light of alternatives (Dryzek 2000). In adversarial democracy there is no inherent 
common interest, but voters pursue their individual interests by making demands on 
the political system, and politicians pursue their self-interest by fighting for re-
election. There is no room for arguments that the interests of some people are better 
than others are (Mansbridge 1980: 17). Votes and preferences are aggregated, not de-
liberated and the inclusion of main economic interest groups into pre-legislative de-
liberation is not legitimate because their representation is not based on any democ-
ratic elections. 
There is, however, another line of argument that puts the inclusion of the main 
economic interest groups in a different light. This argument is based on a more uni-
tary model of democracy. In this case, the participants may initially have conflicting 
preferences about a given issue, but mutual understanding and rational discussion 
may lead to the emergence of a decision that works for the common interest (Mans-
bridge 1980: 25). In concluding broad-based incomes policy settlements, for exam-
ple, the objective rationality of business is naturally different from that of labour. 
This has to lead to bargaining and compromises. In such processes the aim of delib-
eration is to discuss and find solutions that everyone can accept. If the participants 
have not reached a compromise that is objective and everyone can accept it may well 
be the case that no decision will be made at all. It would also be absurd to demand 
that unanimity be reached on all issues. The most important aspect is not unanimity, 
but an ongoing dialogical process where participants try to settle common problems 
and conflicts (Bohman 1996). The legitimacy lies in the process of deliberation 
among those who the matter concern, not in the outcome as a result of voting by de-
mocratically elected representatives. The main point is that deliberation has taken 
place, not necessarily consensus or a unanimous outcome. Instead of reaching con-
sensus, a more desirable procedure is where participants agree on a course of action, 
but for different reasons (Dryzek 2000: 170). Even if it in a collective bargaining con-
text is a great risk that the participants are holding on to their preferences and being 
mainly self-interested, they have nonetheless taken part in a deliberative process and 
continue to do so in other similar processes. Without such a deliberative process, the 
prospects for finding a common interest among business and labour are even more 
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difficult. The counter hypothesis to the first one is therefore based on a unitary model 
of democracy, where the inclusion of the main economic interest groups in legislative 
deliberation is legitimate because the participants have agreed on a single course of 
action as a result of deliberation, despite differing opinions. If this hypothesis holds, 
it would also mean that the arrangements are a form of consensual policy making in 
its true sense, because the participants have agreed on a course of action based on 
reasoned argumentation. If the first hypothesis holds, it would mean a form of im-
posed ‘consensus’ where the more powerful have decided the course of events and 
others have had to comply. The working hours case should give some indications as 
to which one is more accurate. 
2.  The working hours case 
It is no overstatement to say that working hours, together with wages, represent 
one of the central issues of disputes in the labour market. The recent debate has fo-
cused mainly on different models of working hour arrangements. It has been regarded 
as fairly obvious, that too general and rigid models have failed to take into account 
the specific situations individual firms face in a modern labour market. Prevailing and 
outdated working hour arrangements, together with current rates of economic growth, 
have been regarded as a hindrance to the creation of new jobs (Blyton 1985: 36-37). 
Requirements for new working hour arrangements in terms of when, and how, work-
ing hours are placed during the day, week and year have been regarded as an impor-
tant policy-measure in improving employment and economic efficiency (duRoy et al 
1989; McRae 1995; Bercusson/Dickens 1996; Taddei 1998). The main objective has 
consequently been how to create greater opportunities for more individualised flexi-
ble arrangements. In Finland, this has to take place in the context of a thoroughly 
regulated labour market. These regulations are contained in a complex mixture of 
three categories: legislation, collective agreements and employment contracts. The 
complexity of the regulations is also underlined by the opportunities for making di-
verging statements from legislation at the collective agreements, local collective 
agreements, and individual agreements level. In addition, regulations included in 
broad-based incomes policy settlements have sometimes demanded revisions of legis-
lation, especially in the early 1970s.  
2.1 The main dilemmas 
The overall current debate in the 1990s has been focusing on, as noted above, 
how to create a more flexible labour market. Flexibility may be seen as a recent phe-
nomenon of the 1990s, but the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) had already started to discuss new patterns for working hour ar-
rangements in the mid 1960s. The problem was seen as how to introduce greater 
flexibility in the allocation of working hours, such as flexibility of retirement age, 
education and training during working-life, part-time work and temporary employ-
ment (OECD 1973: 6). The issue of flexible working hours has stayed on the agenda 
within OECD, when its recent research has been focusing on empirical evaluations of 
430   Roger Bobacka: Collective Bargaining in Finland 
 
how flexibility has been applied on the labour markets in Europe (OECD 1986; 1990; 
1992; 1995). 
For both workers and employers, the new working hours policy has conse-
quently been directed towards the creation of flexible arrangements, suitable for indi-
vidual options, when traditional working hours policy has been directed towards gen-
eral, universal working hour arrangements, equally binding to all (Hörning et al 1995: 
28-29). The main objective for employers has been to increase the opportunity for 
flexible agreements through legislation, without the opportunity to make delegatory 
statements in collective agreements. This would in turn reduce some of the power of 
the national trade unions and employers’ associations in favour of individual employ-
ers. This would also create greater demands on shop stewards, since they would in-
creasingly have to negotiate directly with the employer. The employers’ basic stand-
point has been, as noted above, a favouring of mandatory statements in legislation, 
which cannot be delegated to collective agreements. The main dilemma for the em-
ployers has become how to extend the operating hours of business, within the limits 
set by government regulations and collective agreements (OECD 1995: 13). 
The issue is more of a dilemma for the trade unions. At the same time as the 
workforce is concerned with more individualised working hour arrangements to bal-
ance time spent between work and spare-time, the trade unions also have to be able to 
defend their members’ interests collectively (OECD 1995: 12). The dilemma for the 
trade unions is consequently how to combine the current trend of demands for indi-
vidual flexible labour market regulations with the collective security of workers. The 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has also stated that more flexible and 
individualised working hour arrangements can be accepted only if they are at the 
same time subjected to collective negotiations. 
The layout of the empirical part is based on how the objective of introducing 
opportunities for more flexible arrangements according to legislation was achieved; 
what arguments the different parties expressed during the decision making process; 
how consensus was reached on the issue; and finally, how dissent, and opposition 
was dealt with. (A new act was approved by the parliament in 1996.)  
2.2  Formulating the new working hours law 
The analysis of the case has been based on arguments stated by the participating 
main economic interest groups from different stages of the decision making process, 
i.e. before the process began in 1990, during the work in the working hours commit-
tee that deliberated the issue 1990-93 and the aftermath of its work 1993-95. In the 
so-called working hours committee that prepared the issue, the workers’ representa-
tives were from the Central Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK), Finnish 
Confederation of Salaried Employees (STTK) and the Confederation of Unions for 
Academic Professionals (AKAVA). The employer’s representatives were from the 
Confederation of Industry and Employers (TT), Department of Public Personnel 
Management (VTML) and the Commission for Local Authority Employers (KT). The 
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material used for the analysis consisted mainly of written unofficial documents and 
comments, statements written down by the chairperson, unofficial and official memo-
randa, faxmessages by the parties and discussions with the negotiators. Based on this 
material, the working hours issue could be divided into three different issue catego-
ries: unanimity, compromise and conflict. The unanimous issues in the revised law 
were characterised by a lack of discussion, since the parties did not comment on the 
content of them. These issues did not touch upon the parties’ preferences, since many 
of them were merely of legalistic nature that had to be included in all legislation. 
There were in all eight such issues. 
The second category, i.e. issues of compromise, was more interesting, since 
these issues to a greater extent touched upon the different parties’ preferences. These 
issues (28 in total) were resolved according to a form of legal reasoning, meaning that 
different types of solutions were compared in terms of similarities and differences. 
The chairperson made a proposal for a new paragraph, which was then discussed in 
the committee. Based on this discussion, the chairperson made revised versions, and 
eventually all the parties could accept a final proposal. These issues naturally implied 
action in terms of the calculation of the options available and their possible conse-
quences, but they could to a greater extent be characterised as argumentation in fa-
vour of, or against, certain statements. If a new act had been based on these issues 
alone, a revised working hours act would have caused no problems, since the parties 
reached an agreement on them. These issues also underlined the fact that, even if the 
representatives did not change their preferences completely, they nonetheless were 
able to accommodate the opposition’s views into their own interest parameters. 
Finally, there were five issues in the category of conflict. All but the final one of 
these issues of conflict dealt to some extent with opportunities for introducing agree-
ments on regular amount of working hours and on maximum amount of overtime 
working hours at firm level, as a complement to the traditional way of making the 
agreements according to collective bargaining. Traditionally, opportunities for firm 
level agreements had been possible only under the auspices of the national trade un-
ions and employers’ associations. (According to statements in the previous working 
hours law, trade unions and employers’ associations that cover the whole country 
have had rights to make their own collective agreements on working hours, with the 
same status as legislation).  
The main conflicts in the committee consequently dealt with issues concerning 
how negotiations on working hours issues were to be arranged in the future - accord-
ing to agreements at a national level or extended opportunities for agreements at the 
firm level. As a result, the conflict, not surprisingly, related to the basic preferences 
of employers, i.e. individual flexible arrangements, as well as the basic dilemma for 
trade unions, i.e. how to preserve the collective rights of workers in the search for 
more flexibility. The rest of the empirical part will therefore focus on how this prob-
lematic issue of the relationship between collective agreements and firm level agree-
ments was resolved. 
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 Issues of conflict 
Before the committee started its work, all parties were in favour in one way or 
another of increasing opportunities for making firm level agreements. A central fea-
ture of statements made by the workers’ representatives before the committee started 
its work, was that the individual and personal opinions of workers had to be taken 
into account. This was clearly expressed in a memorandum from 1990, when the 
largest confederation of trade unions (SAK), outlined the basic principles for the de-
velopment of working hours legislation. In these principles, the importance of collec-
tive agreements was secondary to the importance of individual workers needs. 
‘The starting point is not only a reduction of working hours, but also that the personal and in-
dividual needs of employees have to be taken into account. In making agreements on working 
hours, the employee has to be able independently to choose the kind of working hours that 
suits him best’ (SAK 1991: 30). 
‘If opportunities for agreements at firm level are included into the working hours legislation, 
the trade unions must have opportunities to supervise the procedures. The law must also in-
clude a basic right for workers that cannot be overlooked, not even by national collective 
agreements’. (SAK 1991, 33) 
This was also in line with the employers’ associations’ (TT) view of the needs 
for development. 
‘The current view of working hours is still characterised by a sense of collective rigidness. 
We need more educated and experienced workers ... who can work in a responsible way in 
situations demanding flexibility and versatility’. (Memorandum 18.12.1989, 2) 
The employers’ representatives also stressed that a labour market policy based 
on agreements at the firm level was important, since it would improve the competi-
tiveness of companies and create more responsible workers. Both parties thus stressed 
the needs of individual workers and employers. 
It was significant for the statements during the committee’s work that the work-
ers’ representatives still held that some changes in the working hours legislation were 
necessary in the deep recession Finland was in at that time (early 1990s). According 
to them, merely cosmetic changes were not enough, but if these changes were part of 
the collective agreements, they were willing to accept extended agreements at firm 
levels. In the view of the employers’ representatives, the question of agreements at 
firm levels on working hours was most important. If such agreements were not in-
cluded in the law, a revision was seen by them as unnecessary. During the process, 
the parties consolidated their own positions: the workers’ representatives committed 
themselves to collective agreements and the employers to agreements at the firm 
level. According to the workers representatives ‘…[an introduction of opportunities 
for making agreements at the firm level] means a radical shift in the balance of nego-
tiations’ (SAK 9.10.1992). According to the employer’s representatives ‘…this is the 
most important issue; agreements at the firm level must be developed’ (TT 
28.2.1992). 
The main divergence of interests could be seen as a question of institutional 
choice, i.e. regulations based on collective bargaining, as represented by trade unions, 
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and in the form of individual agreements, as represented by employers’ associations. 
The workers’ representatives opposed the introduction of opportunities to make regu-
lations on working hours according to legislation at the firm level, mainly because it 
would have changed a situation where trade unions had a form of veto-power to make 
binding agreements. The employers’ position on the issue was the opposite, since op-
portunities for making agreements on working hours according to legislation would 
have reduced the power of trade unions. This would have provided employers with 
more freedom to implement flexible working hours simply by keeping within the 
framework provided by legislation, without having to resort to negotiations with the 
trade unions. 
After the committee’s work, the workers’ representatives stressed that the cen-
tral confederations of trade unions have the best opportunity of estimating the bar-
gaining positions of the workers and of the employers. (Committee proposal 1993: 2, 
8) And furthermore.  
‘In this deep recession, there is no need for a revision of the working hours act. Agreements 
made at the firm level must be developed in accordance with collective agreements’ (Memo-
randum 15.4.1993: 4). 
‘The greatest deficiency in the committee’s work is that the opportunity for trade union su-
pervision of workers is weakened. It is surprising that alternatives are presented that do not 
take into account the rights of trade unions to make agreements. According to SAK, the eco-
nomic recession and the spirit of time [a deregulated labour market] cannot be regarded as 
reasons for a revision of the act’ (Memorandum 15.4.1993: 4). 
In the employers’ views, the committee had not brought forward any arguments 
that would speak against the need for agreements at firm levels, at the cost of collec-
tive agreements. According to them ‘…if [the alternative of agreements at firm lev-
els] cannot be agreed upon according to legislation, there is no need for a new act at 
all’ (TT 4.12.1992). 
It is fairly obvious that the problems for the committee to reach a final decision 
was caused by the basic standpoints of the parties, explained above. The employers’ 
representatives would have approved of the chairperson’s proposals since they corre-
lated with their basic preference, i.e. how to extend operating hours of business. The 
workers’ representatives rejected the proposal since it did not fit into their basic pref-
erences of a stress of collective agreements. 
In 1993, the working hours committee had not yet made any final proposal for a 
revised working hours act. It became a task for the government, in particular the min-
ister of labour, to try and find a solution to the problems in order to enable a submis-
sion of a government bill to the parliament. The government subsequently prepared a 
bill on a new working hours act to be submitted to the parliament in 1993. This bill 
was prepared by the labour minister, who was from the Conservative Party, openly 
supporting the views of the employers. The bill was nonetheless withdrawn, because 
of the overall political and labour market situation in 1993. Unemployment reached 
20 per cent, the Finnish economy was, as mentioned above, in a deep recession and, 
in trying to reduce labour market costs, the Centre led government was in open con-
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flict with the trade union movement. The government and the trade unions came close 
to an open conflict in 1993, when the central confederations of trade unions made a 
threat of general strike as a reaction against the government’s social, economic and 
labour market policies (Kauppinen 1994, 333-334). The government had to retreat on 
its intended labour market policies, including the proposed revision of the working 
hours law. 
The revision of the working hours legislation did not stop there, however. In a 
memorandum by a ‘working group for employment’, appointed by the Finnish Presi-
dent, the development of a new working hours act was seen as an important instru-
ment in the fight against unemployment. The new government in 1995, led by a So-
cial Democratic Prime Minister, also stated the importance of a new working hours 
act for the improvement of employment. A government bill on working hours was 
planned for submission to the parliament sometime during the spring of 1996. A min-
isterial working group was set up by the government in 1995, with the task of further 
developing the working hours legislation. Its objective was to include into a revised 
working hours law, in one way or another, some of the new regulations agreed on in 
sectoral collective agreements for 1994-95. In the Collective agreement for the metal 
industry from 1994, for example, it was stated that the starting point was firm level 
and individual agreements, and if no such agreements were made, then the collective 
agreements were to be implemented. The stress on opportunities for agreements at 
firm levels and a reduction of the maximum amount of overtime were seen as the 
most important objectives (Tiitinen et al 1996: 13). The working group consisted of 
the independent expert who had functioned as chairperson in the previous committee, 
a civil servant as the secretary, three representatives from the same central confedera-
tions of trade unions as before, and three representatives from the same central con-
federations of employers’ associations. The tripartite form of legislative preparation 
was thus continued. The working group started its work in autumn 1995, and had to 
finish it by January 31, 1996.  
The starting point for the group was the conflictual issues not resolved by the 
working hours committee in 1993. The issues that had to be resolved were the range 
of application of the new working hours act, regular working hours by agreements at 
firm levels, maximum amount of, and payment for overtime, night work and daily 
rest in connection to EU directives, weekly rest, Sunday work, and the mandatory 
status of the legislation. An additional task for the working group was to implement 
the EU working time directive by November 23, 1996 and make the necessary 
amendments to the Finnish working hours law. 
 The working group 
The range of application of the new act was in itself not particularly difficult to 
resolve in the group. In the first alternative for a new paragraph by the chairperson 
(which was identical to the proposal by the working hours committee), the main prob-
lems that had to be resolved were the position of workers in supervisory positions, 
work done in forests, vehicle drivers and army personnel. The chairperson, supported 
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by the expert on labour legislation, proposed that persons in a supervisory position 
and all forest work should be exempted from the act, and that no special statements 
for vehicle drivers were to be included. The employers’ representatives supported all 
the proposals made by the chairperson. The workers’ representatives strongly ob-
jected that vehicle drivers were to be exempted from the law. Instead, they demanded 
a separate legislative statement to be implemented on vehicle drivers (Memorandum 
22.1.1996). 
A new sentence was added to the proposal February 7, 1996 when vehicle driv-
ers were included into the act. This was a result of negotiations between the govern-
ment and the workers’ representatives. According to the chairperson ‘… vehicle driv-
ers were for some unknown reason included at a very late stage’ (Interview with 
chairperson 6.11.1997). The government’s involvement in the work became even 
more obvious in the next sections, which dealt with the definition and standard 
amount of working hours. 
The most problematic issues in the working group were what was to be regarded 
as a standard number of working hours; the role of collective agreements versus leg-
islation, and opportunities for making agreements at the firm level. The parties agreed 
that the daily standard working hours were to be set at eight, and weekly working 
hours at 40. In the next paragraph, the chairperson suggested that work could be or-
ganised according to a maximum of 120 hours over a three-week period or 80 hours 
over a two-week period for certain areas. These areas were for example, the police, 
customs, hospitals, home work and restaurants. This section was written at the end 
according to the proposal by the chairperson. The employers’ representatives sup-
ported by the chairperson and the expert made a proposal about opportunities for 
making agreements at firm levels on this issue. The workers’ representatives did not 
accept this supplement and it was not included into the final proposal (Memorandum 
22.1.1996). 
The next paragraph became the most difficult for the working group, as it had 
been for the previous committee, i.e. opportunities for making agreements at the firm 
level by following legislative regulations, instead of according to collective agree-
ments. The preferences of the different parties had not changed after the committee 
finished its work. The workers’ representatives did not approve of opportunities for 
making firm level agreements as an alternative to national collective agreements, 
while the employers’ representatives were heavily in favour of such opportunities. In 
a summary by the chairperson one week before the working group’s deadline, he 
mentions that this issue was still to a large extent unresolved, especially when it came 
to the unorganised employers. The preferences expressed by the different parties were 
completely incompatible (Memorandum 22.1.1996). The issue was nonetheless re-
solved after a meeting between the government, which was as mentioned above led 
by the Social Democrats, and the workers’ representative (SAK). After this meeting, 
the government made a statement on how to proceed with this issue. This statement 
was almost completely in line with the workers’ preferences. According to the chair-
person in the previous committee, who functioned as an expert in the subsequent 
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working group, the issues of flexibility and agreements at the firm level were at the 
end diluted. The intentions before the process, where opportunities for more flexibil-
ity would be increased, were at the end much less significant than intended. The only 
area where firm level agreements became possible according to legislation, was the 
largely unorganised sector with employers not bound by any collective agreement 
(for example hairdressers). Such employers and employees could, according to legis-
lation, make agreements on the prolonging of daily working hours by a maximum of 
one hour. The maximum weekly working hours could nonetheless be no more than 45 
hours, and had to be no more than a monthly average of 40 hours. This sector, how-
ever, is only about 5 per cent of the total labour market. This meant that opportunities 
for firm level agreements were only possible under the auspices of central confedera-
tions of trade unions and employers’ associations for 95 per cent of the labour mar-
ket. The workers’ representatives gained an almost complete victory on this issue (In-
terview with expert on labour legislation 6.11.1997). 
This interpretation was also supported by the chairperson. According to him 
‘…a government representative attended a meeting at 9pm with the ‘wishes’ of the 
government that had to be taken into account. They left us no alternative’ (Interview 
with chairperson 7.11.1997). According to one of the employers’ representatives, the 
SAK representatives in the committee spent a whole day at the Ministry of Labour, 
discussing with the government how to resolve the issue. The result of this discussion 
was that the workers’ representatives gained a complete torjuntavoitto (‘unexpected 
victory against all odds’) (Interview with expert on labour legislation 6.11.1997). The 
employers’ representatives were, naturally, not pleased with the procedure, but they 
had no option other than accepting it (Interview with employer’s representative 
10.11.1997). It was, after all, the government’s bill they deliberated.  
On the issue of overtime, the aim of the chairperson, (and expert), was that the 
previously implemented supplementary overtime, which had been added to ordinary 
overtime, was to be withdrawn. They also suggested that the upper limit be set at 138 
hours over a four-month period. This proposal was supported by all the other parties 
in the working group. In addition, the employers’ representatives proposed that the 
maximum annual amount of overtime be set at 416 hours, in line with the EU-
directive. The workers’ representatives suggested the maximum annual amount of 
overtime be 200 hours. If the extra overtime was preserved in the new law, it had, ac-
cording to the workers’ representatives, to be no more than 100 hours annually 
(Memorandum 22.1.1996). The basic positions of the parties were that the employers’ 
representatives thought that the maximum amount of allowed overtime should be 
higher, because the total amount of working hours had been reduced during the last 
decades. The workers’ representatives thought that the maximum amount of allowed 
overtime was higher in Finland than in other countries, and should therefore be re-
duced. The parties reached no agreement on this issue. 
This issue was again resolved by government intervention. As a result of this 
meeting between the government and workers’ representatives, mentioned earlier, the 
government made its own proposal according to which this problem was to be re-
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solved. They decided that the maximum amount of overtime could be 138 hours over 
a four-month period, while the annual maximum amount of overtime could be 250 
hours. In addition, 80 hours per year of overtime could be agreed upon at the firm 
level (Government memorandum 12.2.1996). The government thus made something 
of a compromise, since 80 hours of overtime could be agreed upon at firm level, a 
statement which the workers’ representatives objected to, but the employer’s repre-
sentatives could approve. When it came to payments for overtime, the employers’ 
representatives were of the opinion that the income from overtime work was higher in 
Finland than elsewhere and therefore the payments for overtime could be lower. The 
workers’ representatives thought that since the amount of overtime was higher in 
Finland, then the amount of payments should be relatively higher. Both parties de-
fended their argument by the same international comparison, but came to completely 
different conclusions.  
The implementation of the EU working time directive did not cause any prob-
lems for the group and its participants. The main difference between the directive and 
the Finnish working hours act was that the directive did not limit regular daily work-
ing hours or working weeks. It did on the other hand, state that the average working 
hours could not exceed 48 hours per week, but this could be exempted from by means 
of laws, regulations or collective agreements, on condition that workers were af-
forded equivalent periods of compensatory rest (Official Journal of the European 
Communities 1993: 22). Furthermore, the directive did not limit night and shift work 
and there were no statements about payments for overtime. The structural difference 
between the directive and Finnish legislation was, therefore, that the Finnish law 
stated how many working hours were allowed, while the directive stated the manda-
tory amount of rest (Interview with trade union representative 11.11.1997). In making 
the new working hours act, the starting point was fully to implement the directive and 
thereby prevent disputes over interpretation of the Finnish legislation and its relation 
to the directive (Tiitinen et al 1996: 24). 
The most interesting part of the directive was statements about derogations from 
the directive. It was stated that 
‘Derogations may be adopted by means of laws, regulations or administrative provisions or 
by means of collective agreements or agreements between the two sides of industry provided 
that the workers concerned are afforded equivalent periods of compensatory rest’ (Official 
Journal of the European Communities 1993: 22). 
This meant that the directive did not prevent the trade unions and employers as-
sociations from making their own collective agreements in the future, on condition 
that they did not take away any advantages that the directive gave. The directive was 
consequently incorporated into the Finnish working hours law without any major 
problems in the working group. This was mainly because it did not infringe any Fin-
nish institutional arrangements; it was still possible to derogate from the directive by 
collective agreements between the national trade unions and employers’ associations. 
After the working group had finished its work and submitted a proposal 19 February 
1996, the government submitted a new working hours bill to parliament on 22 April 
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the same year. No changes to the bill were made by parliament and the law came into 
force 23 November 1996. 
2.3 The aftermath 
Even if the new working hours regulations have been in place for almost six 
years now without causing any major problems, it does not mean that the discussion 
around working hours has ended. The main discussion in Finland has continued to be 
concerned with the implementation of increased flexibility on the labour market. 
Even if there are, as mentioned above, few opportunities for arranging flexible work-
ing hours according to the working hours law, the opportunities for diverging from 
legislation by branch-wise collective agreements have nonetheless meant that flexible 
working hour arrangements have been implemented in a great majority of Finnish 
workplaces. Flexible arrangements have also been introduced on, for example, annual 
holidays and salaries, albeit to a lesser extent than working hours. This has been the 
case for both the private and public sector (Seretin 2001). 
As mentioned in the introduction, the latest broad based incomes policy settle-
ment is in force between 2000-02. The settlement was concluded during favourable 
economic conditions in Finland and, consequently, it contained some general wage 
increases combined with a reduction of income tax, which had been promised by the 
government. The settlement did not contain any statements on working hours, apart 
from a provision that there was to be a promotion of … ‘good working hour practices 
and improvement of flexibility based on individual circumstances’ (Incomes policy 
settlement 15.12.2000). In addition, the main economic interest groups signing the 
settlement also supported the appointment of a tripartite working group. Its task was 
to follow international developments of working hours, especially those in other 
European countries. Thus, even if the parties may disagree about the content of work-
ing hours policies, clearly showed by the case study above, they nonetheless continue 
to agree that working hours are of great importance for both labour protection in gen-
eral and for productivity and the efficient use of resources. 
3. Summary and Conclusion 
Returning to the hypotheses, it is debatable whether the inclusion of the main 
economic interest groups in this case can be legitimised by it adhering to a form of 
deliberative democracy. The end result of the conflictual issues was not resolved by 
deliberation among all the issues concern, but by decision by the government in con-
junction with the workers’ representatives. The employers’ representatives had no op-
tion but to accept the final solution negotiated by the government and the workers’ 
representatives. The participants were at the end of the process not equal. It was only 
on the issues of compromise where the inclusion could be regarded legitimate be-
cause the participants agreed on a single course of action as a result of deliberation, 
despite differing opinions. The crucial question is, however, whether it is possible to 
draw any wider conclusions based on a single case? This case has arguably been ‘ex-
treme’ in the sense that it dealt with the basic contemporary dilemmas facing trade 
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unions and business at the moment. In that sense, it could be regarded as a one-off. 
On the other hand, main economic interest groups generally represent strong inter-
ests, and it would be rather naïve to think that they would be able to reach compro-
mises on all issues by assessing alternative reasons and objectives. This would be 
against the very nature of the trade union – business relationship.  
Should the inclusion of the main economic interest groups be abandoned, then, 
in favour of traditional forms of representative democracy where the laws are deliber-
ated and decided by democratically elected politicians with the aid of experts? The 
current arrangements can be regarded as unjust and un-democratic in the sense that 
they are based on the participation of the main economic interest groups only, but the 
outcomes can nonetheless be perceived as just. This has largely been the case in, for 
example Scandinavia and Austria, whereas in the UK, on the other hand, the inclu-
sion of the main economic interest groups in policy making in the 1970s never gener-
ated any widespread support and became short lived. In Scandinavia and Austria, the 
arrangements have worked for the common interest in terms of a labour market char-
acterised by few conflicts together with low inflation and economic growth. The le-
gitimacy of these arrangements is therefore only to be based on the perception that the 
outcomes are just and adhere to the common interest, not the inclusion of specialised 
knowledge as a means of consensus building. In a labour market context specialised 
knowledge soon becomes overshadowed by self-interest. From a democratic perspec-
tive, it becomes a problem of how important means are in achieving certain out-
comes. In the public’s eye, a democratic deficit may be a small price to pay for eco-
nomic well being.  
To conclude, it is conventional wisdom in a deliberative democratic discourse 
that deliberation should more or less automatically lead to more reasoned solutions 
and informed compromises, thereby enhancing democratic legitimacy. This was not 
the case here. In this case, after the representatives from the main economic interest 
groups started deliberating the working hours issue in detail, deliberation instead 
moved from initial expressions of the need for reasoned compromise to entrenched 
positions. A deliberative democratic ideal may therefore remain an ideal when it 
comes to collective bargaining between the main economic interest groups at the na-
tional level. Although the arrangements adhere to justice and the common interest 
they do not comply with either representative or deliberative democratic criteria. 
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